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Abstract
We introduce the (j, k)-Kemeny rule – a generalization of Kemeny’s voting rule that
aggregates j-chotomous weak orders into a k-chotomous weak order. Special cases of (j, k)-
Kemeny include approval voting, the mean rule and Borda mean rule, as well as the Borda
count and plurality voting. Why, then, is the winner problem computationally tractable
for each of these other rules, but intractable for Kemeny? We show that intractability of
winner determination for the (j, k)-Kemeny rule first appears at the j = 3, k = 3 level.
The proof rests on a reduction of max cut to a related problem on weighted tournaments,
and reveals that computational complexity arises from the cyclic part in the fundamental
decomposition of a weighted tournament into cyclic and cocyclic components. Thus the
existence of majority cycles – the engine driving both Arrow’s impossibility theorem and
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem – also serves as a source of computational complexity
in social choice.
1. Introduction
In their seminal paper, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1989) showed that determining the
optimal Kemeny ranking in an election is NP -hard; Hemaspaandra, Spakowski, and Vogel
(2005) later showed completeness for PNP|| . We introduce the (j, k)-Kemeny rule, a gener-
alization wherein ballots are weak orders with j indifference classes (“j-chotomous” weak
orders) and the outcome is a weak order with k indifference classes. Different values of
j and k yield rules of interest in social choice theory as special cases, including approval
voting, the mean rule and Borda mean rule (see Duddy & Piggins, 2013; Duddy, Piggins, &
Zwicker, 2016; Brandl & Peters, 2017), the Borda count voting rule, and plurality voting.
Why, then, is winner determination computationally tractable for each of these other
rules, but not tractable for Kemeny? We show that these other rules each satisfy j ≤ 2
or k ≤ 2, while winner intractability for the (j, k)-Kemeny rule first appears at the j =
3, k = 3 level. This follows from our central result: the well-known NP -complete max
cut problem for undirected graphs can be polynomially reduced to max 3-OP (“OP” for
“Ordered Partition”), a version of max cut for weighted directed graphs or tournaments
in which vertices are partitioned into three pieces rather than two, and pieces are ordered.
In this connection, it’s worth remarking that (3, 3)-Kemeny is a new rule – one that seems
potentially useful in some contexts. Imagine that a small subcommittee is screening job
applicants into three categories: those whose files are strong and should be read by the larger
committee, those who are not appropriate for the position, and a middle group of applicants
worth further consideration if everyone in the top group turns out to be unavailable. If each
c©2018 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.
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max k-OP special case Complexity
max 2-OP P (Theorem 2.2)
Purely acyclic case of max k-OP, k ≥ 3 P (Theorem 2.1)
Purely cyclic case of max k-OP, k ≥ 3 NP -complete (Theorem 1.1)
Transitive case of max k-OP, k ≥ 3 NP -complete (Theorem 1.2)
Table 1: Special cases of max k-OP.
member of the subcommittee privately sorts in this fashion, then (3, 3)-Kemeny seems to be
an appropriate way to aggregate those individual views into a collective recommendation.1
The proof reveals that computational complexity arises from the cyclic component in
the orthogonal decomposition −→w = −→w cycle + −→w cocycle of the weighted tournament induced
by a profile, in which −→w cycle serves as a measure of underlying tendency towards a cycle of
majority preference, while −→w cocycle resists that tendency (see Young, 1974; Zwicker, 1991).
Thus majority cycles – the engines driving both Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem – also serve as a source of computational complexity in
social choice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some notation and
key concepts, while Section 3 briefly reviews the orthogonal decomposition of a weighted
tournament into cyclic and cocyclic components. Readers to whom the decomposition is
new may wish to read the exposition by Duddy et al. (2016), which includes additional
diagrams and worked examples, along with proofs that the two components are orthogonal
under the standard Euclidean inner product and that the corresponding vector spaces are
complements in the Euclidean space of all possible edge-weightings of a tournament (so that
the decomposition always exists and is unique).
Section 4 dissects the relationship between the standard max cut problem for (weighted,
undirected) graphs, and our version max k-OP for weighted tournaments. While standard
max cut is NP -complete for vertex partitions into two or more pieces, the directed version
is polynomial-time for partitions into two pieces and also for partitions into more pieces
when the cyclic component is zero, aka the purely acyclic case. For the general case it is
NP -complete for partitions into k ≥ 3 pieces. Table 1 summarizes these results, which
appear as Theorems 1 (two hardness results) and 2 (two easiness results). Together, they
show that the cyclic component functions as the sole source of intractability in max k-OP ;
the proofs explicate this critical distinction between partitions into two vs. three pieces.
We introduce the (j, k)-Kemeny rule in Section 5, and observe that a number of famil-
iar aggregation rules are special cases (see Table 2). Calculating outcomes for these rules
amounts to optimizing cases of max k-OP ; thus we can transfer complexity results from
Section 4 to the outcome determination problem for these rules. In particular, j ≤ 2 guar-
antees that the weighted tournament is purely acyclic (−→w cycle = 0) while k ≤ 2 guarantees
that −→w cycle plays no role in the aggregation; neither guarantee applies when j, k ≥ 3. How-
ever, if the profile happens to be purely acyclic, the winner can be computed in polynomial
1. This is a variant of the story told by Duddy et al. (2016) as motivation for the Mean Rule (which is
(2, 2)-Kemeny).
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Special case Equivalence to known rule Complexity
(2, 2)-Kemeny Mean Rule P
(2, 21)-Kemeny Approval Voting, with winner as outcome P
(2,L)-Kemeny Approval Voting, with ranking as outcome P
(21, 21)-Kemeny Plurality Voting, with winner as outcome P
(21,L)-Kemeny Plurality Voting, with ranking as outcome P
(L, 2)-Kemeny Borda Mean Rule P
(L, 21)-Kemeny Borda Voting, with winner as outcome P
(3, 3)-Kemeny (new rule: aggregates trichotomous weak orders) NP -hard
(L,L)-Kemeny Kemeny Voting, with ranking as outcome NP -hard
Table 2: Special cases of (j, k)-Kemeny winner determination. In an abuse of notation,
we allow j or k to take on the value 21 (meaning that the inputs or outputs are
univalent orders – dichotomous weak orders whose top set is a singleton) or L
(meaning that inputs or outputs are linear orders). For voting rules that assign
scores to candidates, such as approval voting, the outcome of the election can be
expressed in the form of a winner (candidate with highest score) or in the form
of a ranking (in decreasing order of score). The Mean Rule outcome ranks all
alternatives with above average approval score over all those with below average
score and the Borda Mean Rule acts similarly, but with Borda scores replacing
approval scores (for details see Duddy et al., 2016; see Brandl & Peters, 2017 for
a recent axiomatic characterization of the Borda Mean Rule).
time for any values of j and k; for example, the Kemeny voting rule coincides with the
Borda count in this scenario.
Several ideas developed here (but not those related to complexity) first appeared in
work by Duddy et al. (2016). In the concluding Section 6 we touch on the important,
behind-the-scenes role played by notions of generalized scoring rule (implicit in Myerson,
1995, and explicit in Zwicker, 2008; Conitzer, Rognlie, & Xia, 2009; Xia & Conitzer, 2011;
Zwicker, 2018), and on the distinction between the median procedure and the alternative
generalization of Kemeny’s voting rule used in this paper. Hudry has written several papers
considering complexity issues for special cases of the median procedure, including the case
of aggregating weak orders (see Hudry, 2012 and comments in Section 6).
2. Preliminaries
A tournament (V,E) is a complete, antisymmetric directed graph, wherein V is a finite set
of vertices and E ⊆ V ×V is a set of directed edges (or arcs) satisfying that for each x, y ∈ V
with x 6= y exactly one of the pairs (x, y) or (y, x) belongs to E; we depict (x, y) ∈ E as
an arrow x → y. For the remainder of the paper we will put arrows over symbols for
tournaments and their components, to distinguish them from related but distinct objects
associated with undirected graphs; for example, in Section 4 the vertex sets V and
−→
V are
related but different. A weighted tournament
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ) is equipped with an edge-
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weight assignment −→w of numerical weights to the edges, which can be interpreted as the
flow of some substance through the channels of a network. The antisymmetric extension
of −→w assigns the value −→w ext(b, a) = −−→w (a, b) for each (b, a) /∈ −→E . For example, a 5 on
the a → b edge could indicate a flow of 5 amps of electricity in a wire from a to b (or, as
we discuss next, a flow of net preference arising from a profile of weak order relations). A
weight of negative 5 on a→ b would tell us that 5 units are flowing in the opposite direction,
from b to a, with −→w ext(b, a) = +5. Thus, we view the initial edge orientation as an arbitrary
choice that serves bookkeeping purposes and does not indicate the actual flow direction. In
practice, we will be abusing notation by omitting the ext superscript, conflating −→w with its
antisymmetric extension through the rest of the paper.2
A weak order relation ≥ on −→V is a binary relation that is transitive, reflexive, and
complete (total); if it is additionally antisymmetric then it is a linear order relation. The
induced equivalence relation ∼ is defined by a ∼ b when a ≥ b and b ≥ a both hold. The
most common interpretation of a ≥ b, as an expression of (weak) preference for a over b,
has shaped some of the accompanying terminology; for example, under this interpretation
a ∼ b expresses indifference, and so equivalence classes under ∼ have come to be known
as indifference classes. We will employ such more-or-less standard terms, but the reader
should not allow this terminology to discourage interpretations other than preference.
The indifference classes partition
−→
V , and we can identify a weak order ≥ with a linear
ordering of its indifference classes. Thus, a dichotomous weak order, with exactly two
indifference classes, can be expressed in the form {T > B}, where T is the top class and B
is the bottom, while a trichotomous weak order can be written as {T > M > B} (which,
as a set of ordered pairs, is {(x, y) ∈ −→V × −→V | x ∈ T , or y ∈ B, or (x, y) ∈ M ×M}.
More generally, we will say that a weak order is j-chotomous if it has exactly j indifference
classes. The univalent orders are the dichotomous weak orders of form {{x} > −→V \ {x}},
wherein the top set T is a singleton.
Preference is not the only natural interpretation supported by the aggregation rules we
have in mind. For example, a high school teacher might use a dichotomous weak order
{T > B} to recommend that some of her former pupils – those she places in T – be put
in a more advanced mathematics class next year, while the others would benefit from more
review. Perhaps several former teachers similarly weigh in with placement recommendations
for the same set
−→
V of students. In this case, we obtain a profile Π = {≥i}i∈N of dichotomous
weak orders, where N is the set of teachers.
More generally we are interested in aggregating a profile Π of j-chotomous weak orders
on a set
−→
V . Such a profile induces a weighted tournament
−→HΠ on −→V , in which the weight
−→w (a, b) = |{i ∈ N | a ≥i b}| − |{i ∈ N | b ≥i a}|
2. Alternately, one might obviate any need for extending −→w by including both edges a → b and b → a
to start with; for a weighted tournament one would then demand that the weight assignment −→w be
an antisymmetric function. We don’t take that approach here, as it somewhat complicates some later
arguments. However, a planned sequel (Zwicker, 2018) requires weighted bi-tournaments in which the an-
tisymmetry requirement is dropped, allowing for the decomposition of −→w into (orthogonal) antisymmetric
and symmetric components; the symmetric component can then be interpreted as a weight assignment
to undirected edges.
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on the a → b edge represents the numerical margin by which agents i in N with a ≥i b
outnumber those with b ≥i a.3 We will refer to the resulting weighted tournament as the
flow of net preference. This is another term arising from the preference interpretation –
specifically, the context in which agents are voters in an election and orders in the profile are
ballots in the form of linear preference rankings of the candidates, so that −→w (a, b) represents
the signed margin by which the majority express a preference for candidate a over b.
This weighted tournament
−→HΠ provides only partial information about the original
profile Π, and our analysis here applies only to aggregation rules for which that information
suffices to compute the aggregated binary relation.4 In the voting context, with linear
order ballots, these are known as the “C2” rules according to the classification by Fishburn
(1977). Nonetheless, our results apply to some rules – such as plurality voting – known to
be non-C2, as our profiles are not limited to linear orders. For example, given a profile of
univalent orders {{xi} > −→V \{xi}}, each representing voter i’s plurality ballot for candidate
xi, the induced weighted tournament does encode all differences in plurality scores among
the candidates.
Definition 1 [Pairwise majority relation] Let Π be a profile of weak orders on
−→
V and−→HΠ = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ) be the induced weighted tournament. For a, b ∈ −→V , we write a >µ b if−→w (a, b) > 0, a ≥µ b if −→w (a, b) ≥ 0, and a ∼µ b if −→w (a, b) = 0.
When Π is a profile of linear orders, a >µ b tells us that a majority of the individual orders
in the profile have a >i b, but the term “pairwise majority relation” is something of a
misnomer in the broader context of weak orders.5
We’ll refer to a sequence
a1 >
µ a2 >
µ · · · >µ ak >µ a1 (1)
as a majority cycle or Condorcet cycle. Such cycles are ruled out if >µ is transitive, satisfying
a >µ b >µ c ⇒ a >µ c for all a, b, c,∈ −→V . In general, acyclicity of >µ is a strictly weaker
property (of the underlying weighted tournament or profile) than is transitivity of >µ, or
the even stronger property of transitivity of ≥µ. However, under the conditions that prevail
in Section 4, all ordinal forms of transitivity and acyclicity are equivalent.6
3. Which, if negative, amounts to a positive margin for b over a.
4. For example, this information is insufficient to compute election outcomes under single transferable vote
(aka instant run-off or Hare voting).
5. For example if Π is a profile of 100 weak orders, one with a >i b and the remaining 99 with a ∼i b, then
a >µ b holds. No majority has a >i b, while there exist majorities satisfying both a ≥i b and b ≥i a.
6. Without such conditions, the absence of cycles like that of line (1) does not preclude weaker forms such
as a1 >
µ a2 >
µ a3 ∼µ a1, which violate transitivity of >µ. There exist multiple inequivalent (ordinal)
forms of acyclicity and of transitivity. However, when ≥µ is antisymmetric, or when −→w is purely cyclic,
these distinctions vanish – and one or the other of these conditions hold for the weighted tournaments
constructed in the reductions used to prove Theorems 1.1 and 1.2.
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3. The Orthogonal Decomposition of a Weighted Tournament
A weighted tournament
−→H that assigns weight 1 to each of the edges in a cycle7
a1 → a2 → · · · → ak → a1
and weight 0 to all other edges, is called a basic cycle (or loop current in electrical engineering
speak); the basic cocycle8 (or source) a? at vertex a assigns weight 1 to each edge a → x
from a to another vertex, weight negative 1 to each edge a← x, and weight 0 to each edge
not incident to a. Figure 1 shows examples for a tournament on four vertices.
Figure 1: A basic cycle (on the left) and the basic cocycle b? (on the right). A dashed edge
indicates an edge-weight of zero.
Any fixed enumeration of the set
−→
E of edges of a tournament will identify each edge-
weight assignment −→w with a point9 in the vector space Rm(m−1)2 (where m = |−→V |) en-
dowed with the standard inner product (for u = (u1, u2, . . . ), v = (v1, v2, . . . ), u · v =
u1v1 + u2v2 + . . . – equivalently, multiply weights on corresponding edges, then add these
products10). With this identification, we obtain subspaces Vcycle and Vcocycle as the linear
spans, respectively, of all basic cycles and of all basic cocycles.
For any tournament one can show that these two subspaces are orthogonal complements
in R
m(m−1)
2 . Thus each vector −→w ∈ Rm(m−1)2 has a unique decomposition −→w = −→w cycle +−→w cocycle as a sum11 in which −→w cycle ∈ Vcycle, −→w cocycle ∈ Vcocycle, with −→w cycle · −→w cocycle = 0.
See Examples 1 and 2 in this section; Duddy et al. (2016) provide detailed proofs and more
examples. We say that −→w is purely cyclic if −→w = −→w cycle (with −→w cocycle = 0); −→w is purely
acyclic if −→w = −→w cocycle (with −→w cycle = 0). A purely cyclic −→w always has majority cycles
(unless it is the 0 vector), while a purely acyclic −→w never has any – in fact, purely acyclic
weighted tournaments satisfy a strong, quantitative form of transitivity (see Definition 5).
7. Recall that we have extended −→w to assign weights to edges in both directions. Thus it may be that
the original (unextended) edge-weighting assigned negative 1 to some edge aj ← aj+1 initially oriented
oppositely to the sense of the cycle, but in this case the extended version indeed assigns weight +1 to
the aj → aj+1 edge.
8. Also called coboundary (see Harary, 1959).
9. The ith coordinate of −→w is just the weight assigned, by −→w , to the ith edge in the enumeration.
10. This requires that the underlying tournaments supporting u and v have matching edge orientations
(which is why we cannot freely reverse the orientation of an edge whose weight happens to be negative).
11. The electrical engineer would say that every flow of a current in a circuit can be written uniquely as a
superposition of loop currents added to a superposition of sinks and sources.
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Example 1 Consider a tournament on three vertices, with edges initially oriented cycli-
cally: a1 → a2 → a3 → a1. The vector space of all edge-weight assignments is then R3;
the cyclic subspace Vcycle consists of all
−→w that assign equal weights to these three edges,
forming a one-dimensional line L in R3 (passing through the points (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1));
and the cocyclic subspace Vcocycle consists of all
−→w that assign weights to these three edges
that sum to 0, forming a two-dimensional plane perpendicular to L.
Suppose the weight function −→w is of a mix of both components, with neither being
zero. In this case, the weighted tournament may or may not exhibit a majority cycle
– the situation depends on which component predominates in the sum. If the sign of−→w cycle + −→w cocycle agrees with that of −→w cycle on enough edges, then −→w will exhibit a cycle,
which we will refer to as “overt.” If not, then stripping out the cocyclic component will
necessarily reveal a cycle, which had been masked or “hidden” by the cocyclic component.
Thus, having no such hidden cycles is equivalent to pure acyclicity, and this condition is
strictly stronger than having no overt cycles; for more on “hidden” versus “overt” cycles
see Observation 1 and footnote 20.
In electrical engineering, this decomposition serves as the mathematical foundation of
Kirchoff’s Laws (Kirchoff, 1847) of circuit theory, but its roots lie in one-dimensional ho-
mology theory, within algebraic topology (see Croom, 1978; MacWilliams, 1958; Harary,
1959). In particular, the orthogonal projection of −→w onto Vcocycle (which yields −→w cocycle)
coincides with the boundary map of homology. The decomposition was first applied to the
flow of net preference by H. P. Young (1974) in his characterization of Borda’s voting rule,
and was later exploited by Zwicker (1991) and by Saari (1994). Quite recently, it was used
by Duddy et al. (2016) to characterize the Mean Rule for the aggregation of dichotomous
weak orders, and by Brandl, Brandt, and Seedig (2016) to characterize maximal lotteries.
The relevance of the decomposition to profiles of weak or strict preference ballots can be
appreciated from the following observation:
Observation 1 In the decomposition −→w = −→w cycle +−→w cocycle of any weight function −→w for
a weighted tournament:
1. The cocyclic component −→w cocycle of −→w assigns to each edge a→ b the scaled difference
aβ−bβ
|−→V | in symmetric Borda scores
12 of the two alternatives; we might say that “the
Borda count is the boundary map.”
2. Thus, for a purely acyclic edge-weighting the pairwise majority relation yields a tran-
sitive ranking, which agrees with the ranking induced by Borda scores.
3. More generally, these two rankings agree when the cocyclic component is dominant in
the sense that −→w (a, b) always agrees in sign with −→w cocycle(a, b). However, when the
12. Standard Borda scoring awards a weight of m − 1 to the candidate ranked first on a (linearly ordered)
ballot, m−2 to the candidate ranked second . . . and 0 to the candidate ranked mth (last). The symmetric
version uses weights of m− 1, m− 3, m− 5, . . . , −(m− 3), and −(m− 1) (for last-ranked); equivalently,
to find the weight awarded to x by a ballot, subtract the number of alternatives ranked strictly over x
from the number ranked strictly under. This equivalent version extends Borda scoring weights to weak
orders. The score of a candidate is the sum of weights awarded by all ballots, with candidates then
ranked in order of decreasing score (and the Borda winner determined by highest score). While standard
and symmetric weights produce different scores, they induce the same final ranking.
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cyclic component becomes large enough to reverse a few edge weight signs, but not so
many as to introduce Condorcet cycles (“overt” majority cycles), these rankings differ.
That difference can be attributed to the “hidden” cycles of the cyclic component.
Example 2 Consider the following profile T28 with 28 trichotomous weak order inputs on
the four-element set {a, b, c, d}:
• 16 copies of {a} > {b, c} > {d},
• 8 copies of {b} > {c} > {a, d},
• 4 copies of {b, c} > {d} > {a}.
The induced weighted tournament is on the left of Figure 2; its weight function −→w is a vector
in <6. To see why the weight on the d → a edge is −12 (for example), note that the first
16 orders have a > d, the next 8 have a ∼ d and the last 4 have d > a, for a resulting “net
preference for d over a” of −16 + 0 + 4 = −12.
Symmetric Borda scores for T28 are aβ = 20, bβ = 32, cβ = 16, and dβ = −68 (see
footnote 12). As |−→V | = 4, aβ−bβ|−→V | = −3 =
−→w cocycle(a, b), whence (by Observation 1.1) the
a→ b edge – for example – of the middle tournament is labeled −3 in Figure 2. Edge-weights
for −→w cycle are then determined by −→w cycle(x, y) = −→w (x, y)−−→w cocycle(x, y).
The cocyclic component may now be written as the linear combination
5a? + 8b? + 4c? − 17d?
of all four basic cocycles, in which the coefficient of x? is x
β
|−→V | ; alternately one can use
a? + b? + c? + d? = 0 to express −→w cocycle in terms of any three basic cocycles. As shown in
Figure 3, −→w cycle can be written as a linear combination
7(a→ b→ d→ a) + 4(b→ c→ d→ b) + 3(a→ c→ d→ a)
of three basic cycles. The −3 on the d → b edge of −→w cycle can then be seen as the sum of
+4 from 4(b→ c→ d→ b) and −7 from 7(a→ b→ d→ a) (negative because the sense of
the cycle opposes that of the directed edge).
Figure 2: The weighted tournament induced by profile T28, and its decomposition.
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Figure 3: The cyclic component from Figure 2 written as a linear combination of three basic
cycles.
4. A Version of Max Cut for Weighted Tournaments
In the well known max cut problem, one starts with an undirected graph G = (V,E) with
finite vertex set V . A vertex cut is a partition P = {J,K} of V into two pieces, and is
assigned a score v(P) equal to the number of edges {a, b} ∈ E whose vertices are “cut” by
P (meaning a ∈ J and b ∈ K, or a ∈ K and b ∈ J). The max cut (decision) problem takes
G along with a positive integer s as input, and asks whether there exists a vertex cut of G
with score at least s. It is one of the best known NP -complete problems. The corresponding
optimization problem seeks a cut of maximal score; any such optimization problem inherits
NP -hardness when the associated decision problem is NP -hard.
For our purposes, a certain generalization will be useful. A vertex k-partition P has
k nonempty pieces, with score equal to the number of edges {a, b} ∈ E whose vertices
belong to different pieces of P. The max k-cut problem then asks whether there exists
any k-partition meeting or exceeding some specified threshold score, with corresponding
optimization problem formulated as one would expect. Our main concern will be with the
weighted versions of these problems: in a weighted graph G = (V,E,w) the function w
assigns an edge-weight w(e) ≥ 0 to each edge e ∈ E and the score is the sum of the weights
assigned to edges that are cut. The decision problem (or optimization problem) is similarly
NP -complete (respectively, NP -hard). For the weighted version there is no loss of generality
in assuming G is complete; just add all the missing edges and assign them weight zero.
We consider a version of max cut for weighted tournaments or directed graphs
−→H =
(
−→
V ,
−→
E ,−→w ) for which the real-number edge-weights may be negative,13 with a linearly or-
dered partition of the vertices playing the role of a “cut.” For example, we might partition−→
V into two disjoint and nonempty pieces, T (for top) and B (for bottom); the ordered par-
tition
−→P = {T > B} is then equivalent to a dichotomous weak order  on −→V . An ordered
tripartition {T > M > B} similarly corresponds to a trichotomous weak order on −→V , while
a linear order on V is equivalent to an ordered |−→V |-partition, which has as many non-empty
pieces as there are vertices, so that each piece is a singleton.
13. For the directed problem, allowing negative weights adds no generality; if one reverses an edge while
simultaneously reversing the sign of its weight, the effect on the max k-OP problem (see Definition 2)
is nil. Negative weights provide the notational flexibility needed to express the decomposition −→w =−→w cycle +−→w cocycle.
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Given a weighted tournament
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ) and an ordered k-partition −→P corre-
sponding to a k-chotomous weak order  on −→V , we say that an edge (x, y) goes down if
x  y, goes up if y  x, and goes sideways if x ∼ y. For the example in Figure 4, (a, c),
(a, e) and (d, f) go down; (g, b), (g, d) and (c, b) go up; and (a, b) and (f, e) go sideways.
The score −→v of an ordered k-partition −→P is now defined from the original (not extended)−→w by:
−→v−→w (
−→P ) =
∑
(x,y)∈−→E goes down
−→w (x, y) −
∑
(u,v)∈−→E goes up
−→w (u, v). (2)
Note that the score is independent of weights on sideways edges. Thus in Figure 4 we have
−→v−→w (
−→P ) = [3 + 4 + 5]− [1 + 3 + 4] = 4. (3)
Figure 4: A weighted directed graph and ordered 3-partition
If we instead interpret −→w as denoting the antisymmetric extension of the original weight
function (see Section 2), equation (2) can be rewritten as:
−→v−→w (
−→P ) =
∑
x y
−→w (x, y). (4)
Definition 2 Max k-OP (“OP” for “ordered partition”) is the decision problem that takes
as input a weighted tournament
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ) for which −→w is integer-valued, along with
an integer s, and asks whether there exists an ordered k-partition with score at least s. The
corresponding optimization problem seeks an ordered partition achieving maximal score.
Why propose this particular adaptation of max cut for tournaments? For one thing, max
k-OP serves as the basis for a generalization (in Section 5) of the Kemeny voting rule that
yields a variety of aggregation rules – rules already known to social choice and judgement
aggregation – as special cases. A second justification arises from mathematical naturality;
solving max k-OP is equivalent to finding a vector (from among those representing k-
chotomous weak orders) that maximizes the inner product with a given, second vector
(representing the weight function −→w ). The equivalence will be discussed by Zwicker (2018).
Our goal is to show that both the purely cyclic and the transitive subcases of max k-OP
are NP -complete for k ≥ 3, but polynomial-time solvable for k = 2 and for arbitrary k
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when −→w cycle = 0. A first hardness result reduces max 3-cut to the purely cyclic sub-case
of max 3-OP, while a second construction reduces max 2-cut to the transitive sub-case of
max 3-OP. Either reduction alone suffices to show that max 3-OP is NP -complete (as max
3-OP is easily seen to lie in NP), but the two serve different roles. The first establishes that
intractability can arise from the cyclic component in isolation – a mix of both components
is not required. However, it leaves open the possibility that overt majority cycles alone
suffice for the analysis, with no role left for the orthogonal decomposition and its revelation
of hidden cycles in explaining why some instances of max k-OP are in P while others are
NP -hard.14 By showing that the transitive subcase remains NP -hard, the second reduction
closes off this possibility and (in light of the first easiness result) establishes the essential
role of hidden cycles in explaining the hardness boundary in max 3-OP.
Theorem 1 Let k ≥ 3.
1. The problem max k-OP is NP-complete, even in the purely cyclic case.
2. The problem max k-OP is NP-complete, even in the transitive case.
Our first easiness result shows that the purely acyclic sub-case of max k-OP is solvable
in polynomial time, for each k ≥ 2. The second result shows that for the special case k = 2,
the cyclic component has no effect on the the solution to max k-OP ; we may safely suppress
it, at which point the first easiness result applies.
Theorem 2 The following problems are polynomial-time solvable:
1. the purely acyclic case of max k-OP (for each fixed k ≥ 2, and also with k folded in
to the input),
2. max 2-OP.
In combination these two theorems argue that the two components have independent effects
on computational complexity.15
If we attacked max k-OP via brute force search over all ordered k-partitions (of the
vertex set
−→
V of a weighted tournament), then for any fixed k ≥ 2 we would find that the
number of such partitions grows exponentially in the number |−→V | of vertices. The key idea
in the proof of Theorem 2.1 is that this search space can be reduced to one of polynomial
size O(|−→V |k−1) for fixed k and purely acyclic −→w ; part 2 follows from part 1, once we show
that the cyclic component may be ignored for the special case of ordered partitions into
exactly two pieces.
14. We are indebted to one of the referees of an earlier COMSOC conference version of this paper, who
pointed us to this issue. The referee observed that if we assume transitivity of the majority preference
relation, identifying the winning order for the standard Kemeny rule (for aggregating linear orders into
a linear order) is computationally easy, and asked whether the same assumption might suffice to render
the (3, 3)-Kemeny winner problem easy. The second reduction shows the answer to be “no.”
15. What is the added value of orthogonality to an orthogonal decomposition? Consider the force of gravity
on a block resting on an inclined plane, decomposed into a first component of force normal to the
plane and a second parallel to the plane. It is precisely the orthogonality of these two components that
guarantees that the first force has zero tendency to make the block slide, while the second has zero
tendency to make the block stick; the effects are independent because the components are orthogonal.
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We turn now to the proof of Theorem 1.1, beginning with a polynomial reduction of
max 3-cut to max 3-OP. The idea is to replace a weighted graph G with a correspondingly
weighted tournament
−→HG in such a way that each tripartition P of G’s vertices corresponds
to an ordered tripartition
−→P of −→HG ’s vertices satisfying v(P) = −→v (−→P ). The −→HG construction
produces, for each edge {a, b} of G, two new vertices (in addition to the original vertices of
G) and four edges. More precisely:
Definition 3 Let G = (V,E) be any complete (finite, undirected) graph and w :E → R be
an associated nonnegative edge-weight function. The induced weighted tournament
−→HG is
defined as follows:
• For each edge e = {a, b} ∈ E of G, construct two direction vertices dab and dba of HG.
Let D = {dab | {a, b} ∈ E} denote the set of direction vertices and assume D∩V = ∅.
• −→HG’s vertex set is −→V = D ∪ V , with elements of V referred to as ordinary vertices.
• Add all edges of form a → dab and dab → b to −→HG, with −→w assigning to each the
original weight w({a, b}) of {a, b} in G; then add enough arbitrarily directed edges to
make
−→HG a tournament, with −→w assigning weight 0 to each of these.
Notice that each edge e = {a, b} of G thus contributes an {a, b} 4-cycle
a −→ dab −→ b −→ dba −→ a (5)
of edges in
−→HG , each with weight w({a, b}). In particular, −→w is purely cyclic. The combina-
torial core of the Theorem 1.1 proof consists of the following:
Lemma 1 (Fitting a four-cycle into three levels) Let
−→P = {T > M > B} be any ordered
tripartition of the vertex set
−→
V of
−→HG. Then for each weight w edge e = {a, b} of G:
• if a and b belong to the same piece of −→P then the net contribution to the score −→v (−→P )
made by the edges of the {a, b} 4-cycle of line (5) is zero, and
• if a and b belong to any two different pieces of −→P then, by appropriately reassigning
the direction vertices dab and dba among T , M , and B, we can set the net contribution
to −→v (−→P ) made by the edges of the {a, b} 4-cycle equal to 0, or +w, or −w, as we
prefer.
Proof: Figures 5L, 5C, and 5R (for Left, Center, Right) show three possible ways to assign
the four vertices a, b, dab and dba to membership in the three pieces of
−→P . In 5R ordinary
vertices a and b belong to the same piece (here, piece M) of
−→P . Of the four edges in the
{a, b} 4-cycle, two are up edges and two are down edges; as each edge has weight w the
net contribution of these four edges is zero. More generally, whenever a, b ∈ M it is easy
to see that the number of up edges from the {a, b} 4-cycle must equal the number of down
edges, no matter where dab and dba are placed, and that this remains true in case a, b ∈ T
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Figure 5: Some possible ways to fit an {a, b} 4-cycle into three levels.
or a, b ∈ B. Thus the net contribution is 0 whenever the ordinary vertices a and b are in
the same piece.
In 5L and 5C, ordinary vertices a and b are in different pieces, and we have placed dab
and dba so that there are two down edges and one up edge. If each edge has weight w then
the net contribution of the four edges shown is w. If we exchange the placements of dab and
dba in 5L (or in 5C), we wind up with two up edges and one down edge for a net contribution
of −w; if we move dab and dba into a common piece, then (as in the previous paragraph)
the number of up edges will be equal to the number of down edges, for a net contribution
of zero. A moment’s thought will convince the reader that for all cases in which ordinary
vertices a and b belong to different pieces, exactly four possibilities – two up edges and one
down, two down edges and one up, one down edge and one up, or two down edges and two
up – can be achieved by moving dab and dba around. This completes the Lemma 1 proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1, parts 1 and 2.
Proof of Theorem 1.1: Continuing, for the moment, with the special case k = 3, it
suffices to show that given an edge-weighted graph G and a positive integer r the answer
to the decision problem “Does there exist a vertex tripartition P = {J,K,L} of V with
v(P) ≥ r?” is the same as the answer to “Does there exist an ordered tripartition −→P of the
vertex set
−→
V of
−→HG with −→v (−→P ) ≥ r?”
Lemma 1 makes this easy. Given a tripartition P = {J,K,L} of V with v(P) = q ≥ r,
arbitrarily order {J,K,L} as {J > K > L}, which becomes the ordered partition of −→HG ’s
ordinary vertices. For each weight w edge {a, b} of G cut by P, add each direction vertex
dab, dba to one of the sets in {J > K > L}, so as to create two down edges and one up edge
from the {a, b} 4-cycle; for each original uncut edge {a, b} of G add each vertex dab, dba to
one of the sets {J > K > L} arbitrarily. It is easy to see that the resulting −→P achieves the
exact same score: −→v (−→P ) = v(P) = q ≥ r.
In the other direction, consider an ordered tripartition
−→P = {V1 ∪ D1 > V2 ∪ D2 >
V3∪D3} of −→V with V1∪V2∪V3 = V , D1∪D2∪D3 = D, and −→v (−→P ) ≥ r. Let P = {V1, V2, V3},
a tripartition of V . Each weight w edge {a, b} of G cut by P contributes w to v(P) and
contributes w or 0 or −w to −→v (−→P ). Thus v(P) ≥ −→v (−→P ) ≥ r, as desired. This completes
our polynomial reduction of max 3-cut to max 3-OP.
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Our argument generalizes easily to a polynomial reduction of max k-cut to max k-OP ;
in particular, the construction of
−→HG does not change at all, while the proof of Lemma 1
generalizes straightforwardly for ordered partitions into k ≥ 3 pieces.
We will combine this reduction with the following straightforward reduction of max cut
to max k-cut : to a weighted graph add k − 2 new vertices, along with new edges joining
them to each other and to all old vertices, and place very large weights on all these new
edges. A maximal-score partition P† of the enlarged weighted graph then consists of any
maximal score partition P of the original vertices into two pieces, combined with k−2 other
sets, each containing one new vertex. Thus P may be read off from P†.
The combination reduces max cut to (the purely cyclic case of) max k-OP, for each
k ≥ 3. As max cut is known to be NP -complete, while max k-OP (along with its purely
cyclic sub-case) is clearly in class NP , Theorem 1.1 now follows.
We turn now to the proof of Theorem 1.2, which reduces max cut to the transitive
sub-case of max k-OP. Transitivity here refers to the ordinary “qualitative” version, as
expressed for a weighted tournament16
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ), by:
If −→w (x, y) > 0 and −→w (y, z) > 0 then −→w (x, z) > 0, (6)
for all x, y ∈ V with x 6= y (with −→w denoting the antisymmetric extension of Section 2).
Proof of Theorem 1.2: Transitive max 3-OP reduces to transitive max k-OP for any
(finite) k ≥ 4, as follows: add k − 3 new vertices D1, . . . , Dk−3 and put very large weights
on all x→ Dj edges for x ∈ V and all Di → Dj edges for i < j, so that any optimal ordered
partition consists of an optimal ordered partition of the original vertices into three pieces,
sitting above k − 3 additional pieces, each of form {Dj}. It suffices, then, to reduce max
cut to transitive max 3-OP.
As in the proof of Theorem 1.1, we specify a polynomial translation that converts a
weighted graph G = (V,E,w) containing |V | vertices (which – without loss of generality –
is complete and for which w(e) is a nonnegative integer for each edge e = {a, b} ∈ E) into a
weighted tournament
−→FG = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ). This time our goals for −→FG are a bit different. Let
C = 1 + Σe∈Ew(e) and ε = 172|V |4 . Then our construction will satisfy that:
1. −→w is transitive in the sense of equation (6), and
2. For each positive integer r the answer to the decision problem “Does there exist a
vertex bipartition P = {J,K} of V with v(P) ≥ r?” is the same as the answer to
“Does there exist an ordered tripartition
−→P of the vertex set −→V of −→FG with
−→v (−→P ) ≥ 〈〈3|V |C + r〉〉?” (7)
Here 〈〈x〉〉 rounds x to the nearest integer. Given G = (V,E) and w:E → < as above, we
now define the weighted tournament
−→FG = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ) induced by G and w as follows:
16. We mean that for a weighted tournament induced by some profile of weak or strict rankings, this condition
is equivalent to ordinary transitivity of the strict majority preference relation as defined at the end of
Section 2. However, the construction that follows never assigns edge-weights of 0, and in this setting all
forms of transitivity of majority preference become equivalent.
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• Choose any reference linear order . of G’s vertex set V .
• Each vertex a ∈ V contributes a quadruple of ordinary vertices a1, a2, a3, and a4 to−→
V , along with three directed “placement” edges (see Figure 6):
a1 −→ a2 −→ a3 −→ a4 (8)
weighted as follows: −→w (a2, a3) = 2C and −→w (a1, a2) = C = −→w (a3, a4).
• Each edge e = {a, b} of G having weight w and satisfying a . b contributes two
additional direction vertices dab and dba to
−→
V , along with four directed “adjustment”
edges:
a2 −→ dab −→ b2; b3 −→ dba −→ a3 (9)
with each such edge assigned weight w (if w > 0) or weight ε (if w = 0).
• To make −→FG into a tournament, we need to add edges between pairs of vertices that
are not yet linked in either direction. The direction of each can be chosen carefully (as
detailed immediately below) in such a way that no cycles are created. Assign weight
ε to each of these “tiny” edges.
Suppose we temporarily erase all weights on the edges of
−→FG , and also omit all the tiny
edges, retaining the placement and adjustment edges. The resulting unweighted digraph
EG is acyclic (meaning there are no cycles that respect edge direction), thanks to the use of
the reference linear order .; staring at Figure 6 can help explain what’s going on here. Any
such acyclic digraph can be extended to an acyclic tournament by adding new edges one-
at-a-time.17 Once these tiny edges are added and assigned positive weight ε, the resulting
weighted tournament is transitive, as desired. Moreover, ε is small enough to guarantee
that the total contribution of all weight ε edges to the score of any ordered tripartition is
less than 12 in absolute value. Thus we are safe when, for the remainder of this proof, we
simultaneously ignore the presence of weight ε edges and use of rounding in condition 7.
Any score-maximizing tripartition
−→P = {T > M > B} of −→FG will also maximize that
part of the score contributed by the placement edges (which have weight 2C or weight C),
because the value of C is large enough to make any nonzero contribution by a single weight-
C edge overwhelm the total contribution of all adjustment edges (which have weights from
the original graph G). To maximize the placement edge part of the score it is necessary, for
each quadruple a1, a2, a3, a4 of ordinary vertices, either to place a1, a2 ∈ T , a3 ∈ M , and
a4 ∈ B – in which case we will say that −→P places a up – or a1 ∈ T , a2 ∈M , and a3, a4 ∈ B
– in which case
−→P places a down. Either such arrangement achieves a contribution of 3C
from a1, a2, a3, a4, and it is easy to see that one cannot do better than that. Hence, when
seeking to maximize the score of
−→P we may assume that each original vertex of G is either
placed up or down, for a total contribution of 3|V |C from placement edges.
17. It is easy to see that if adding edge x −→ y would introduce a cycle, and adding y −→ x would also do
so, then there must have been a cycle in the original digraph. The argument is essentially the same as
that by Hammer, Ibaraki, and Peled (1981), though the context there is somewhat different: alternating
cycles in an undirected pregraph (a generalization of a graph wherein a vertex pair {a, b}may be classified
as an edge or a non-edge, or may be unclassified).
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Figure 6: Part of the digraph EG showing the (directed) placement and adjustment edges
arising from three vertices a . b . c (and corresponding undirected edges) of G.
Note the absence of cycles.
Figure 7: Two quadruples (with a up, b down) and direction vertices (as positioned to
achieve a net contribution of w from the adjustment edges).
Assume the weight of some edge {a, b} of G is w, and a . b. Figure 5 shows the corre-
sponding quadruples, placed in an ordered 3-partition
−→P so that a is up and b down. The
direction vertices dab and dba have been positioned so that the net contribution made to−→v (−→P ) by the four corresponding adjustment edges is w+ 0−w+w = w. It is straightfor-
ward to check that one cannot achieve a contribution greater than w by moving dab and dba
into different pieces of
−→P . The situation is the same when a is down and b is up; one can
position dab and dba to achieve a net contribution of w from the adjustment edges, and no
greater contribution is possible. Finally, when a and b are either both up, or both down,
the net contribution made by the four corresponding adjustment edges is 0, regardless of
where one positions dab and dba.
Thus, given a partition P = {U,D} of G’s vertices with a score v(P) of at least r one can
construct an ordered 3-partition
−→P of −→FG ’s vertices with score at least 3|V |C+ r by placing
all vertices in U up, all in D down, and positioning the direction vertices to maximize the
contribution of adjustment edges, as detailed in the previous paragraph.18 Conversely, given
an ordered 3-partition
−→P of −→FG ’s vertices with score at least 3|V |C + r, we know that each
18. Recall that we are suppressing all mention of tiny edges and of ε contributions to −→v (−→P ).
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original vertex must be placed in the up or down position. The considerations of the previous
paragraph then imply that by setting U = {a ∈ V | a is up} and V = {b ∈ V | b is down}
we obtain a partition {U, V } of G’s vertices with a score of at least r.
The proof of Theorem 2 rests on a sequence of lemmas and definitions, including the
abstract definition of Borda score19 as the “net weighted out-degree” of a vertex x in a
weighted tournament. In the following definitions −→w denotes the antisymmetric extension,
as discussed in Section 2.
Definition 4 Given a vertex x of a weighted tournament
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ), x’s Borda score
is given by:
xβ =
∑
y ∈V
−→w (x, y) (10)
Definition 5 A weighted tournament
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ) satisfies exact quantitative transi-
tivity if
−→w (x, y) +−→w (y, z) = −→w (x, z) (11)
holds for every three distinct vertices x, y, z ∈ −→V .
Definition 6 A weighted tournament
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ) is difference generated if there exists
a function Γ:
−→
V → R such that
−→w (x, y) = Γ(x)− Γ(y) (12)
holds for every two distinct vertices x, y ∈ −→V . In this case, we can identify the vertices of−→H with a sequence of real numbers
γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ · · · ≤ γm (13)
enumerating Γ’s values in non-decreasing order.
We show next that pure acyclicity is equivalent to difference generated-ness as well as
to quantitative transitivity:20
Lemma 2 The following are equivalent for a weighted tournament
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ):
1. −→w satisfies exact quantitative transitivity,
2. −→w is difference generated,
19. In Section 5 we obtain a weighted tournament
−→HΠ = (A,E,−→wΠ) from a profile Π of weak (or linear)
orders over a finite set A of m alternatives. The score of a vertex a ∈ A according to Definition 4 coincides
with the conventional notion of a’s Borda score based on Π, as calculated using the “symmetric” Borda
scoring weights m− 1,m− 3, . . . , 3−m, 1−m of footnote 12.
20. In particular, just as transitivity rules out overt cycles, the stronger property of quantitative transitivity
rules out all cycles, hidden or overt.
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3. −→w is purely acyclic (equivalently, wcycle = 0 in the vector orthogonal decomposition−→w = −→w cycle +−→w cocycle; equivalently, −→w ∈ Vcocycle, the cocycle subspace).
Proof of Lemma 2: For (1) ⇒ (2), assume −→w satisfies exact quantitative transitivity.
Choose any x0 ∈ −→V , and assign an arbitrary real number (a discrete analogue of a constant
of integration) as Γ(x0)’s value. For each y ∈ −→V set Γ(y) = −→w (y, x) + Γ(x0). Then
for y, z ∈ −→V , −→w (y, z) = −→w (y, x) + −→w (x, z) = −→w (y, x) − −→w (z, x) = [−→w (y, x) + Γ(x0)] −
[−→w (z, x) + Γ(x0)] = Γ(y) − Γ(z). Conversely, if −→w is difference generated via Γ then−→w (y, x) +−→w (x, z) = [Γ(y)− Γ(x)] + [Γ(x)− Γ(z)] = Γ(y)− Γ(z) = −→w (y, z), so −→w satisfies
exact quantitative transitivity.
If −→w is purely acyclic then, as an immediate consequence of Observation 11.2 by Duddy
et al. (2016), −→w is difference generated via the function assigning scaled symmetric Borda
scores:
Γ: x 7→ x
β
|−→V |
. (14)
Conversely, assume −→w is difference generated via Γ, and let x1, x2, . . . , xr, x1 be any cycle of
vertices. The corresponding basic cycle σ is an edge-weighting of
−→H that assigns weight one
to each edge xi → xi+1 or xr → x1 from the vertex cycle (under the reversal convention),
and weight zero to each other edge. Thus
−→w ·σ = [Γ(x1)−Γ(x2)]+[Γ(x2)−Γ(x3)]+· · ·+[Γ(xr−1)−Γ(xr)]+[Γ(xr)−Γ(x1)] = 0. (15)
It follows from linearity of the dot product that −→w · τ = 0 holds for any linear combination
of basic cycles – hence −→w ⊥ Vcycle, and −→w ∈ Vcocycle. Thus −→w is purely acyclic. The
argument is like that for Proposition 15 by Duddy et al. (2016).
The central idea in showing that pure acyclicity renders max k-OP polynomial-time
solvable (Theorem 2.1) is that one may safely restrict attention to those ordered partitions
that respect the order induced by the function Γ whose differences generate the edge-weights:
Definition 7 An ordered k-partition P = {Pk >′ Pk−1 >′ · · · >′ P1} of a nondecreasing
sequence γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ · · · ≤ γm of real numbers is monotone if i < j ⇒ pi(γi) ≤′ pi(γj), where
≤′ refers to the ordering of P’s pieces, and pi(γi) denotes the piece Ps for which γi ∈ Ps.
Equivalently, monotone partitions are obtained by “cutting” the γ sequence from line
(13) with k − 1 dividers ↓i :
γ1, γ2, . . . , γm1 ↓1 γm1+1, . . . , γm2 ↓2 . . . ↓k−1 γmk−1+1, . . . , γm (16)
Lemma 3 Given a set S = {γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ · · · ≤ γm} of real numbers listed in nondecreasing
order let
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ) be the weighted tournament on −→V = S for which −→w (γi, γj) =
γi − γj, for each i, j with 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m. There exists a monotone ordered k-partition of−→
V that achieves maximal score (among all k-partitions of
−→
V ).
Proof of Lemma 3: It is straightforward to show that if some ordered partition
−→P
satisfied i < j with pi(γi) >
′ pi(γj) then swapping γi for γj (by moving γi into the piece to
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which γj initially belonged, and γj into γi’s initial piece) can never decrease
−→P ’s score. A
sequence of such swaps converts
−→P into a monotone partition.
Proof of Theorem 2.1: Given a purely acyclic instance
−→H = (−→V ,−→E ,−→w ) of max k-OP
with m = |−→V | vertices, calculate the Borda scores from line (10). Identify −→V with these
Borda scores γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ · · · ≤ γm, arranged in nondecreasing order. An exhaustive search
would then compute −→v (−→P ) for each possible monotone ordered k-partition of the γj , of
which there are at most (m − 1)k−1 because there are at most m − 1 options for placing
each divider ↓i in line (16); output any optimal monotone partition (which is an optimal
partition by Lemma 3) and its score. This calculation is in O(mk−1 log(mW )) time (where
W is the largest weight), but with standard dynamic programming techniques this improves
to O(km2 log(mW )) time (which remains polynomial-time if k is included in the input).
Proof of Theorem 2.2: For any ordered partition
−→P of a directed graph, the score
−→v (−→P ) is a linear functional on the vector space of all possible edge weightings −→w , so that
−→v−→w (
−→P ) = −→v−→w cocycle(
−→P ) + −→v−→w cycle(
−→P ). Thus, once we demonstrate that for 2-partitions
−→v−→w cycle(
−→P ) = 0, it follows that 2-partitions also satisfy −→v−→w (
−→P ) = −→v−→w cocycle(
−→P ).
Next, observe that the multiple options for fitting a cycle into three levels of an ordered
partition (Lemma 1, Figure 5) are severely constrained for ordered partitions having only
two levels. As suggested by the example in Figure 8, for 2-partitions the number of down
edges will always equal the number of up edges. Thus, for the basic cycle σ that assigns
weight 1 to each edge that appears in Figure 8, and weight 0 to every edge not drawn in,
−→vσ(−→P ) = 0. By linearity, the same holds for any linear combination of basic cycles, and so
we conclude that for ordered 2-partitions
−→P , −→v−→w cycle(
−→P ) = 0.
Figure 8: Fitting a cycle into two levels.
5. The (j, k)-Kemeny Rule
Suppose that {v1, . . . , vm} is a (finite) set of m alternatives, and that voters in a finite set
N cast weak (or linear) order ballots, resulting in a profile Π = {≥i}i∈N . The induced
weighted tournament
−→HΠ = (−→V ,−→E ,−→wΠ) is as follows:
• −→V = {v1, . . . , vm}
• −→E = {(vi, vj) | i < j}. Remark: This adds one edge for each two vertices.
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• −→wΠ(vi, vj) = |{t ∈ N | vi ≥t vj}| − |{t ∈ N | vj ≥t vi}|. These weights are voters’ net
preferences for vi over vj .
Definition 8 The (j, k)-Kemeny rule takes, as input, a profile Π of j-chotomous weak
orders on a finite set of alternatives, and outputs the k-chotomous weak order(s)21 on the
alternatives corresponding to the solution(s) of max k-OP for
−→HΠ. The (j,L)-, (L, k)- and
(L,L)-Kemeny rules are defined similarly, with linear ordered ballots when L appears in the
j position, and linearly ordered outputs when L appears in the k position.22 A 2r in either
position refers to r-valent dichotomous weak orders, corresponding to ordered 2-partitions
{T > B} for which |T | = r.
Note that a dichotomous weak order {T > B} can be interpreted as an approval ballot
approving all alternatives in T . A 1-valent (aka univalent) order {{x} > B} can be inter-
preted as naming x as winner (when it is the output) or as a plurality ballot for x (when
it is an input). The r-valent case with r > 1 is also of interest for representing winning
committees of exogenously specified size (as in Kilgour, 2010; Elkind, Faliszewski, Skowron,
& Slinko, 2017; Aziz, Brill, Conitzer, Elkind, Freeman, & Walsh, 2017). With that un-
derstanding, approval voting will be our first example of a special case of (j, k)-Kemeny.
The list of such special cases contains a number of other familiar rules as well, including all
in Table 2 (Section 1). Proofs justifying the Table 2 entries are straightforward, but (for
reasons we discuss in the next section) these will appear in a later paper by Zwicker (2018).
Our proof of Proposition 1 for approval voting should suffice to give the flavor:
Proposition 1 (2, 21)-Kemeny is approval voting, with outcome the approval winner(s).
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider a profile Π? consisting of a single ballot {T > B},
corresponding to a single approval ballot of T , with induced weighted tournament
−→HΠ? =
(
−→
V ,
−→
E ,−→wΠ?). It is easy to see that for any two alternatives x and y, the weight −→wΠ?(x, y)
on the x → y edge is the difference AppΠ?(x) − AppΠ?(y) in their approval scores (which
will be +1, −1, or 0). Now consider a more general profile Π with a number of ballots. The
weight −→wΠ(x, y) on the x→ y edge of −→HΠ is likewise the difference AppΠ(x)− AppΠ(y) in
approval scores, because it is a sum of the contributions AppΠ?(x)−AppΠ?(y) made by the
individual ballots. The score of a univalent ordered partition {{x} > −→V \ {x}} will then be
the sum
Σ
y∈−→V \{x}[App(x)−App(y)],
which is maximized when x has a greatest approval score.
The Theorem 2 results now lift23 immediately to (j, k)-Kemeny, showing:
21. Ties are possible. When the number of ties is large, there may be an exponential blow-up in the number
of orders in the output. However for the first 7 rules listed in Table 2, the output can be described in a
compact language that describes a class of tied orders in terms of ties among individual alternatives.
22. Allowing L as a value is useful, but represents an abuse of notation, as j or k then no longer serve as
parameters that take only fixed numerical values.
23. Given that the edge weights for (j, k)-Kemeny arise from net preferences, we can replace W (in the The-
orem 2 proof) with n, the number of ballots or voters, so that the final conclusion (of O(km2 log(mW ))
time) becomes O(km2 log(mn)) time.
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Theorem 3 The problem of determining the winning ordering for a (j, k)-Kemeny election
is in P whenever j or k is equal to 2 (or to 2r for r ≥ 1 any integer), and also whenever−→wΠcycle = 0. In particular, winner determination is in P for the first seven rules of Table
2. Also, for profiles satisfying −→wΠcycle = 0, the (j,L)-Kemeny outcome is the linear ranking
induced by Borda scores; in particular, the original Kemeny rule agrees with Borda.
We need to be a bit more careful when lifting the NP -hardness results from Theorem 1
to the context of (j, k)-Kemeny, however. To argue for NP -hardness when j ≥ 3 or j = L,
we need to know that the specific weighted tournaments
−→HG constructed in the proofs of
Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 are induced by some profile Π of j-chotomous orders (j ≥ 3), and
for some profile of linear orders. Actually, from these proofs it can easily be seen that
inducing some scalar multiple C−→w of the weights as −→wΠ would suffice, for each of these
types of profile. But given an arbitrary integer-valued −→w for V = {v1, v2, v3, . . . , vm}, and
working for the moment with j = 3, we can construct a profile of trichotomous weak orders
satisfying −→wΠ = 2−→w , as follows: the profile with two trichotomous weak orders
Π = {v1} > {v2} > {v3, . . . , vm} ; {v3, . . . , vm} > {v1} > {v2} (17)
satisfies −→wΠ(v1, v2) = 2 and assigns weight 0 to every other edge. Thus by combining
profiles similar to Π we can build an arbitrary function −→w taking even integer values. For
j > 3, modify line 17 by breaking {v3, . . . , vm} into several pieces, ordered oppositely by
the two orderings of Π. This constructions generalizes those by McGarvey (1953) and by
Debord (1987). We have established:
Theorem 4 The problem of determining the winning ordering for a (j, k)-Kemeny election
is NP-hard if j ≥ 3 and k ≥ 3 both hold or if j = L and k ≥ 3 both hold. In particular
winner determination is NP-hard for (3, 3)-Kemeny.
None of our reasoning here shows NP -hardness when k = L; in particular, Theorem
4 does not draw hardness conclusions for (L,L)-Kemeny (that is, for the original Kemeny
rule itself) or for (j,L)-Kemeny with j ≥ 3, because max cut is not polynomially reducible
to “max L-cut”24 (unless P = NP , of course). Nonetheless, our argument that computa-
tional complexity arises from the cyclic component also applies to the cases missing from
Theorem 4. We already know (Bartholdi et al., 1989) that the original Kemeny rule winner
problem is NP -hard, and the last clause of Theorem 3 tells us that Kemeny reduces to a
computationally easy rule when −→wΠcycle = 0. As for (j,L)-Kemeny, we have just shown that
for j ≥ 3 the induced weights −→wΠ from profiles of j-chotomous weak orders are essentially
as general as those arising from linear rankings, so winner determination is as hard as for
the original Kemeny rule.
A second interesting question was raised by one of our COMSOC referees: what happens
to tractability when the cyclic component is simple? What happens, for example, if −→w cycle
24. “Max L-cut” is in quotes because it is silly (there exists only one unordered partition of a vertex set into
singletons, so it must be the optimal such partition). At first, it was frustrating that our methods did
not seem to apply to the original Kemeny rule itself. However, with Theorem 1.2 the fundamental nature
of this obstacle became clear; the methods we use here establish hardness for the transitive subcase, so
they cannot possibly show hardness of Kemeny winner, which is not hard for that case.
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can be written as a sum of only one or two simple cycles? We conjecture (but with low
confidence) that winner determination for (3, 3)-Kemeny would become tractable in this
case. In this connection, it seems worth mentioning that the dimension of the cocyclic
subspace grows linearly with the number of alternatives, while the dimension of the cyclic
space grows quadratically. In a sense, then, the cyclic component is inherently the more
complicated one, so that sharply limiting its complexity places a rather strong restriction
on the underlying profile.
6. Connections: the Median Procedure, Generalized Scoring Rules,
and Future Work
The (j, k)-Kemeny procedure presented here is closely related to, but distinct from, the
median procedure (Barthe´lemy & Monjardet, 2009; Hudry, 2012), a better-known general
method for aggregating binary relations from one class into a relation from a possibly dif-
ferent class. When applied to the median procedure, several of the Table 2 restrictions
yield the exact same aggregation rule as they do when applied to (j, k)-Kemeny; this hap-
pens, for example, when j = L or k = L. In particular, the (L,L)-median procedure is
the Kemeny voting rule25, the (2,L)-median procedure yields, as outcome, the ranking by
approval score, and the (L, 21)-median procedure yields the Borda winner(s).
But while (2, 2)-Kemeny yields the mean rule, the (2, 2)-median procedure does not (it
seems unlikely that any reasonable version of the mean rule arises as a median procedure
restriction) and the (2, 21)-median procedure provably differs from approval voting. So what
explains the pattern of agreement and disagreement between these two general procedures?
We will address this issue in a planned sequel (Zwicker, 2018), but briefly sketch the
analysis here. The median procedure (as well as the Kemeny voting rule) is commonly
defined in terms of distance minimization via an appropriate metric δ, but there is an
equivalent inner product formulation that is a bit friendlier to the analysis we have in mind.
Suppose we wish to aggregate a profile Π = {Ri}i∈N of binary relations belonging to some
specified input class I, to obtain a binary relation S belonging to some specified output
class O. We represent each binary relation R (on a set A with |A| = m) via its symmetric
characteristic vector xR = (xR1 , x
R
2 , . . . , x
R
m(m−1)); here x
R
i = 1 if the i
th ordered pair (in
some enumeration of all ordered pairs (a, b) in A × A satisfying a 6= b) is a member of R,
and xRi = −1 otherwise. Now each Ri awards xRi · xS points to any relation S ∈ O. Sum
these points over all i ∈ N to obtain the score of S; the outcome of the aggregation is the
S ∈ O with highest score.
This method coincides with the median procedure, as usually defined.26 Because the
method awards points to binary relations rather than to the underlying alternatives in A,
it constitutes a generalized scoring rule (in the sense of Myerson, 1995; Zwicker, 2008;
Conitzer et al., 2009).
25. In this connection, social choice theorists tend to think of the median procedure as a generalization of
the Kemeny voting rule, but Barthe´lemy and Monjardet (2009) suggest the idea had parallel roots in a
variety of fields.
26. The distance δ from Ri to S is related to the point award x
Ri · xS via a negative affine transform
(δ 7→ Aδ + B, where A,B are real constants with A < 0), so that minimizing summed distance is
equivalent to maximizing summed points.
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The difference between the median procedure and (j, k)-Kemeny can now be explained
in terms of the vector space Rm(m−1) spanned by the characteristic vectors for all possible
binary relations on A. This space is subject to a second orthogonal decomposition, of
Rm(m−1) into symmetric and antisymmetric subspaces Vsym and Vantisym (see footnote
2). Here Vsym is the span of all characteristic vectors x
R of symmetric binary relations
(satisfying (a, b) ∈ R⇔ (b, a) ∈ R) and Vantisym is the span of vectors xR of antisymmetric
binary relations (satisfying (a, b) ∈ R ⇔ (b, a) /∈ R). Let asym(xR) denote the orthogonal
projection of xR onto Vantisym.
We obtain an equivalent formulation of (j, k)-Kemeny by modifying the inner prod-
uct version of the median procedure (as defined two paragraphs previous) as follows: use
asym(xRi) · asym(xS) in place of the original xRi · xS . The matter of whether some par-
ticular restriction of the median procedure agrees with the corresponding restriction for
(j, k)-Kemeny now comes down to the role of the symmetric component in the aggregation.
If either I or O live entirely within Vantisym, the symmetric component has no effect on the
aggregation – projection onto Vantisym thus has no effect on the points awarded, and the
restriction of the median procedure via I and O coincides with the corresponding restriction
for (j, k)-Kemeny. In particular, this is what happens whenever linear rankings are used as
I or as O; it does not happen when I = O = the class of dichotomous weak orders.
Thus, while the proofs justifying lines of Table 2 are straightforward, we prefer to
postpone these arguments to a planned sequel (Zwicker, 2018), which will focus on the role
of orthogonal decomposition in these sorts of procedures and in the families of specific rules
that arise as their restrictions. There we will explore more precisely the exact relationships
between special cases of the median procedure, and corresponding special cases of (j, k)-
Kemeny.
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